Jail Informant N.A. gives information on jail mate Sigfredo Garcia to Isom (TPD) and Sanford (FBI). The admissibility into court of some of the statements by this informant is questionable (assuming the State tried to introduce the statement and the defendant raised a timely or pre-trial objection).
The admissions by Garcia are admissible. So statements like "I was the shooter" are admissible.
Hearsay and double-hearsay statements made to informants are less likely to come in (A defendant may, of course, waive a hearsay objection by not making it).
There are many exceptions to the hearsay rule and I won't go into too much detail here.
But, for example, if the informant says something like: Garcia told me that Magbanua told him that Donna told her that the money they would be receiving comes from her - well, it is unlikely that such a statement would come in. With respect to conspiracies, the general rule on hearsay statements by co-conspirators is as follows (taken from a drug trafficking conspiracy case):
Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 90.803(18)(e), the following hearsay is admissible:
A statement by a person who was a coconspirator of the party during the course, and in furtherance, of the conspiracy. Upon request of counsel, the court shall instruct the jury that the conspiracy itself and each member's participation in it must be established by independent evidence, either before the introduction of any evidence or before evidence is admitted under this paragraph.
This exception to the hearsay rule “ ‘requires (1) that these statements be made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, and (2) that independent evidence establish the conspiracy before the statements are allowed.’ ” Arguelles v. State, 842 So.2d 939, 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting Brooks v. State, 787 So.2d 765, 773 (Fla.2001)). As such, the question that must be addressed is “whether there was competent, independent evidence, without consideration of any hearsay statements of co-conspirators, to establish defendant as a participant in a conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.” Christie v. State, 652 So.2d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (on rehearing). A defendant's participation in such a conspiracy must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
34 In order “[t]o establish a conspiracy and appellant's participation in it, the state must prove ‘an express or implied agreement or understanding between two or more persons to commit a criminal offense,’ and an intention to commit that offense.” Arguelles, 842 So.2d at 944 (quoting Sheriff v. State, 780 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). “Direct proof of the agreement is not necessary; it may be inferred from the circumstances.” Arguelles, 842 So.2d at 944. Florida courts have upheld conspiracy convictions where defendants are involved in a series of meetings, arrangements and negotiations to sell or buy illegal drugs that lead to such sale or purchase. Pino v. State, 573 So.2d 151, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Only where, unlike this case, the defendant's involvement in the enterprise appears to be minimal at best, evincing no prearrangements with the other defendants ... have Florida courts been inclined to reverse such conspiracy convictions.
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